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I set out to answer one question about personal identity – what does it take for 
a conscious self to survive from an earlier time to a later time? I examine both 
pure psychological-continuity and phenomenal-continuity theories before 
proposing a hybrid account of the persistence of the self that draws on both 
psychological and phenomenal influences while avoiding the problems that 
both theories face in their pure forms. Such a hybrid theory retains the benefits 
of a phenomenal account of intra-streamal unity, and provides a better account 
of inter-streamal unity in terms of psychological continuity. 
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My goal in this paper is to answer one question about personal identity – what 
does it take for a conscious self to survive from an earlier to a later time? 
Psychological continuity theories have been the dominant theories of personal 
identity, and a phenomenal approach based on continuities in conscious 
experience has largely been neglected because of the difficulty of accounting 
for survival across periods of unconsciousness. Dainton’s phenomenal 
continuity theory is a good account of intra-streamal unity – survival over the 
course of a single stream of consciousness, but its account of inter-streamal 
unity is implausible. I propose a hybrid account of the persistence of the self 
that draws on both psychological and phenomenal factors while avoiding the 
problems that both theories face in their pure forms. Such a hybrid theory 
retains the benefits of a phenomenal account of intra-streamal unity, and 
provides a better account of inter-streamal unity in terms of psychological 
continuity. 
 
In §2, I discuss the psychological account. It is a sophisticated 
descendant of Locke’s memory-based account, and there are many variations 
of the psychological account. Derek Parfit’s psychological continuity theory 
has been the most widely referenced, and is the basis for the psychological 
component of my hybrid theory. 
 
In §3, I discuss Dainton’s phenomenal continuity theory and his 
motivation for a phenomenal account of the persistence of the self. Dainton’s 
phenomenal continuity theory is largely an attempt to find an alternative to the 
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psychological account. I examine his positive proposal – the inseparability 
thesis, as well as his reasons for the rejection of other theories such as the 
memory-based account, and then I move on to an explication of his 
phenomenal continuity theory, and the problems it faces. The biggest obstacle 
to the phenomenal continuity theory is the so-called bridge problem of 
accounting for survival from one stream of consciousness to the next, and 
while Dainton proposes a solution to the bridge problem, his solution is 
subject to at least two counterexamples to which I am not sure he will be able 
to provide a response.  
 
The psychological and phenomenal accounts are the most plausible 
theories of personal identity over time, but on their own, they do not paint a 
complete picture. In §4, I propose an account of personal identity over time 
that is not simply a disjunction of the two theories, but combines what I 
consider to be the best of both theories. The hybrid theory that I propose 
allows for survival when there is a break in either phenomenal or 
psychological continuity, as long as either phenomenal or psychological 
continuity persists when there is a break in the other. In cases where is there is 
a concurrent break in both phenomenal continuity and psychological 
continuity, there is no survival of the self. Such a theory is consistent with our 






2.  Parfit’s Psychological Continuity Theory 
 
Parfit’s psychological continuity theory forms the basis for the 
psychological continuity component of my proposed hybrid theory. A simple 
thought experiment illustrates the motivation for the psychological continuity 
theory. Imagine that you undergo an operation in which your brain is 
transplanted into another person’s body, and that other person’s brain is 
transplanted into your body. When you wake up, how are you more likely to 
react? Are you more likely to think that you have woken up with the same 
brain in a new body, or that you have woken up with a new brain in your 
original body? It seems that most people will identify with having woken up 
with the same brain in a new body, rather than that they have woken up in the 
same body with a new brain.1 
 
According to the psychological-continuity theory, the relations that 
matter in personal identity are psychological connectedness and psychological 
continuity. Psychological states include memories, beliefs, intentions, desires, 
etc. If I have a memory ME of an experience E, the memory ME and 
experience E are psychologically connected, and psychological connectedness 
is a direct relation. Psychological continuity involves overlapping chains of 
psychological connectedness. At a later time, I might have a psychological 
state that is not psychologically connected to my earlier experience E, but it is 
                                                
1 This thought experiment does not distinguish between psychological states and streams of  
consciousness. Dainton’s theory did not come into existence till much later, so this was a 
typical thought experiment used in support of the psychological continuity theory prior to 
Dainton. 
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still psychologically continuous with E, because there are overlapping chains 
of psychological connectedness between E and my current psychological state. 
 
Parfit also makes the claim that it is not personal identity that matters. 
It is the relations of psychological connectedness and psychological continuity 
that matter, and these relations do not presuppose personal identity, so they 
can hold even when identity is not preserved. What matters is not that 
someone in the future is numerically identical with me, but that someone 
survives as me. In the most widely cited of examples, consider a case in which 
my brain is operated on and split in two. One half of my brain is destroyed, 
and the other half is transplanted into a new “brain-less” body. The person that 
wakes up with my half of a brain is psychologically continuous with me, and 
he has my personality traits, memories, and desires. I am inclined to agree 
with Parfit that most who consider this situation will agree that the person who 
wakes up is me.2 
 
Consider another case in which I undergo an operation where my brain 
is surgically split in two, and both hemispheres are transplanted into two 
different “brain-less” bodies. It seems incorrect to say that I do not survive this 
operation in which both hemispheres of my brain have been transplanted into 
two new bodies, since we agree that I survive an operation in which only one 
hemisphere has been transplanted. It is also incorrect to say that I have 
survived as only one, but not the other person, because what would give me 
reason to choose one over the other? Any such reason will be arbitrary. 
                                                
2 Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." Philosophical Review 80, no. 1 (1971): 4–5. 
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According to Parfit, it makes the most sense to say that I have survived the 
operation as both persons, since both resulting persons are psychologically 
continuous with me, albeit to a lesser degree than if my whole brain had been 
transplanted into a single new body.3  
 
According to Parfit, survival is a matter of degree. We are more 
affected by our recent experiences, and may be indifferent towards 
experiences that occurred a long time ago. It is normal that our personalities, 
desires, and intentions change over time, and we forget events that have 
occurred in the distant past. I have better recall of what I did yesterday than 
what I did a year back, and I might not even have memories of what I did 10 
years ago. The same applies to the future. To a certain extent, I have more 
concern about my future self tomorrow than my future self in 20 years.  
 
3.  Problems with the Psychological Continuity Theory 
 
A problem for the psychological continuity theory is that it allows for a 
duplicate of me, to be me. Dainton suggests that if our material bodies are 
destroyed and later reconstructed with our pre-existing psychology, the 
resultant person will simply be a duplicate of our earlier self. If so, it seems 
unlikely that we will identify ourselves with the resultant person or be 
especially concerned about their fate, despite their being psychologically 
continuous with our earlier self. 
 
                                                
3 Ibid., 5–6. 
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 Parfit describes a series of mars-teletransportation thought experiment 
cases that illustrate possible objections to the psychological theory. The first 
these thought experiments is an example of Dainton’s objection – that the 
psychological-continuity theory allows for a duplicate of me, to be me. In 
what is called the simple teletransportation case, a blueprint of “me” is 
created, for the purpose of “teletransporting” me to Mars. For this blueprint to 
be created, my self on Earth (Earth-me1) has to undergo scanning that destroys 
my physical body. About an hour later, with the help of the blueprint, Mars-
me1, a psychologically continuous with Earth-me1 replica, is constructed on 
Mars. In this case, while the processes that preserve psychological-continuity 
are superficially different from the normal way in which we are used to, the 
relevant causal features of psychological continuity are retained.4  
 
I wake up as my duplicate thinking that I have been teletransported to 
Mars, not knowing that I am merely a replica of my earlier self on Earth 
because my physical body on Earth has been destroyed, and Mars-me1 was 
created after the destruction of Earth-me1 with the help of the blueprint. Mars-
me1 is psychologically continuous and qualitatively identical with Earth-me1, 
but they are not numerically identical. This thought experiment illustrates that 
the psychological continuity theory allows for a duplicate of me, to be me, 
because unlike physical travel, each time I undergo teletransportation, I 
undergo duplication.5  
                                                
4 In the normal way, it is overlapping chains of psychological connectedness that preserve 
psychological continuity. In this case, we assume that teletransportation preserves 
psychological continuity, just in a different manner. 
5 Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984),197–200.  Parfit 
addresses the issue, but it is not in response to Dainton’s objection, simply because Dainton 
raises the objection only years later. 
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Parfit’s development of the thought experiment into what is called the 
branch-line case highlights a second problem for the psychological continuity 
theory – it allows you to be psychologically continuous with more than one 
past or future person at the same time. Suppose advancements in technology 
allow for non-destructive scanning, and after undergoing a scan, I (Earth-me2) 
wake up and find myself still in the scanning room on Earth. I am told that if I 
wait awhile, I will be able to talk to my duplicate on Mars (Mars-me2) via 
intercom. Both Earth-me2 and Mars-me2 are psychologically continuous with 
pre-non-destructive scanning Earth-me1. In the simple teletransporter case, I 
was also replicated, but it is not immediately obvious, because Earth-me1 and 
Mars-me1 do not co-exist at the same time due to destructive scanning.6  
 
Suppose that Earth-me2 will die in a few hours, because the new 
scanner caused a cardiac defect in my physical body during scanning. Before 
dying, Earth-me2 talks to Mars-me2, and Mars-me2 seems to think that he is 
Earth-me2. Like Earth-me2, Mars-me2 is psychologically continuous with 
Earth-me1; he has the same memories and beliefs as Earth-me2. Mars-me2 and 
Earth-me2 are qualitatively identical (apart from their hearts, since Earth-me2 
has a cardiac defect), but not numerically identical. They can talk to each 
other, but not read each other’s thoughts. When Earth-me2 pinches himself, 
Mars-me2 does not feel it, and when Earth-me2 dies, Mars-me2 continues to 
live on. 
 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
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Before Earth-me2 dies, there is a short period during which both Earth-
me2 and Mars-me2 both exist, and are both psychologically continuous with 
Earth-me1. According to Parfit, I do not die in the branch-line case, because 
Mars-me2 is psychologically continuous with Earth-me1, and survives as me. 
We might say that I survive for a short amount of time as one person, and for a 
longer amount of time as another person. Parfit does not think that this is a 
problem, because he thinks that what is needed is for us to re-evaluate our 
attitudes towards survival and identity. Survival and identity can come apart, 
and there is no reason why it is a problem that I survive as two persons, 
because all that matters is that at least one person survives as me. While Parfit 
seems content to say that there’s survival in these cases, many people will find 
this hard to swallow, hence the motivation to seek an alternative to the 
psychological theory.7  
 
4.  The Phenomenal Continuity Theory 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Dainton thinks that while a psychological continuity approach is better 
than bodily-continuity or memory-based theories, it is still not the correct 
account of personal identity over time. Most of our psychology works behind 
the scenes, and it seems that we can replace sizeable chunks of it without 
affecting our experiences. From thought experiments, it also seems possible 
that we can leave our psychology behind and continue to exist.8,9 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 According to bodily-continuity theories, to be the same self over time simply requires 
continuous bodily existence from an earlier time to a later time, and according to memory-
based accounts, our selves follow our memories. 
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Dainton thinks that a phenomenal account of the self is intuitive, 
metaphysically coherent, and superior to other accounts of the self because the 
link between survival and phenomenal continuity is extremely strong. If we 
are to imagine that we have the power to “experience moving in any way that 
we desire, in any direction, and at any speed”, no matter how fast or far we are 
to travel, where we go, our stream of consciousness will follow. He thinks that 
it is unimaginable that we can leave our streams of consciousness behind, and 
as long as our stream of consciousness flows on, “we can imagine surviving 
total ruptures in material and psychological cum causal continuity.” He spells 
this principle out as the Inseparability Thesis, according to which “self and 
phenomenal continuity cannot come apart – all the experiences in a single 
(non-branching) stream of consciousness are co-personal.”10  
 
As support for the inseparability thesis, Dainton and Bayne describe 
five variations on a series of thought experiments that involve mental 
exchanges between two persons to demonstrate that physical continuity and 
psychological continuity each on their own are not “person preserving”, but 
phenomenal continuity on its own is “person preserving”. I briefly run through 
thought experiments three to five of the series. These thought experiments 
support their thesis that when phenomenal continuity is isolated from physical 
                                                                                                                           
9 Dainton, Barry, and Tim Bayne. "Consciousness as a Guide to Personal 
Persistence." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 4 (2005), 556–558. 
10 Dainton, Barry, and Tim Bayne. "Consciousness as a Guide to Personal 
Persistence." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 4 (2005), 557.; Dainton, Barry. The 
Phenomenal Self. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.), 73. 
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and psychological continuity, it is conceivable that one’s body and psychology 
can be left behind.11  
 
In the third experiment, a full mental transfer of both psychological 
and phenomenal continuity is performed between two persons. The result of 
such a transfer is the same as if an exchange had been by performed by a 
physical brain transplant. After the experiment, it is most likely that each 
subject will think that he has woken up in a new body, rather than that he has 
woken up with new mental states. This suggests that “the combination of 
phenomenal continuity and psychological continuity is person preserving”, but 
physical continuity on its own is not.12  
 
In the fourth experiment, a partial mental transfer is performed. Both 
subjects exchange their psychology, but their streams of consciousness remain 
with their original physical bodies. According to Dainton and Bayne, this is no 
different from brainwashing. This “suggests that the combination of 
phenomenal continuity and physical continuity is person preserving”, but 
psychological continuity on its own is not, and phenomenal continuity is 
compatible with psychological discontinuity.13 
 
In the fifth experiment, both subjects retain their psychology, but their 
streams of consciousness are “exchanged”. In such a case like this, where 
                                                
11 Dainton, Barry, and Tim Bayne. "Consciousness as a Guide to Personal 
Persistence." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 4 (2005), 556–558.  
12 Ibid., 556–557. 
13 Ibid., 557. 
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psychology stays put, but streams are exchanged, we’re intuitively inclined to 
say that their selves follow their streams of consciousness.14 
 
Dainton does not state explicitly that his formulation of the 
inseparability thesis is a counterexample to a theory of dispositions, but from 
the three examples just described, it is not a priori obvious that streams of 
consciousness must originate from the same substrate. 
 
We are also asked to imagine zombification. A philosophical zombie is 
physically just like a person, but does not have conscious experiences – there 
is “nothing it is like” to be a zombie. Dainton and Bayne suggest a modified 
zombification procedure that causes a person to lose his capacity for 
phenomenal experience, but keep his psychological states. According to 
Dainton and Bayne, despite retaining our psychological states, we are no 
longer capable of having conscious experiences, so most of us will consider 
such a fate equivalent to death.15   
 
4.2  The Cartesian View of the Self 
 
Dainton does not discuss the Cartesian view of the self, but I introduce 
it here because his phenomenal continuity theory builds on some of the 
principles of the Cartesian view. There are two ways to interpret the Cartesian 
view of the self – the traditional or modified view.16 
                                                
14 Ibid., 558. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Unger, Peter. Identity, Consciousness, and Value. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990.), 15–16. 
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According to the Traditional Cartesian View, a person exists so long as 
he or she is consciously thinking. This view is similar to Dainton’s Essentially 
Conscious Self (ECS) – “a self is something whose essential nature is to be 
conscious; selves are experiencing at all the times at which they exist; selves 
cannot cease to be conscious and continue to exist.” A problem with this view 
is that there are times during which we are not actively thinking, for example, 
when we are in a state of deep dreamless sleep, or if we have been put under 
anesthesia. Dainton’s ECS does not survive a night of deep dreamless sleep, 
but the Traditional Cartesian View allows that we survive the night “because 
we do have conscious experiences through the night, but we “forget them 
completely and forever, directly upon having them.”17  
 
The Modified Cartesian View is only slightly different in that “a 
person will exist just as long as she is continuously involved in thinking, or 
mental activity, whether conscious or non-conscious”. It is no better an 
account than the Traditional Cartesian view if we subject it to Peter Unger’s 
super-freezing and super-thawing thought experiment. Suppose the technology 
exists to freeze us instantaneously, preserving our precise molecular 
arrangement for as long as we wish to remain frozen, and when required, we 
can be instantaneously thawed without any disruption to our experience or 
psychology. If I were thawed 50 years later, I would not know that 50 years 
had passed, and my experiences would pick up from where they left off just 
before I was super-frozen. There will have been a gap of 50 years during 
                                                
17 Dainton, Barry. The Phenomenal Self. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.), 77.; 
Unger, Peter. Identity, Consciousness, and Value. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990.), 15–16. 
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which I had no conscious or non-conscious mental activity, during which I did 
exist, but not according to the modified Cartesian view.18 
 
Both the traditional and modified views suggest that the existence of 
selves might be intermittent, but we are inclined to believe that we survive the 
procedures of super-freezing followed by super-thawing despite having no 
conscious or non-conscious mental activity during the period we were frozen, 
so it seems both the traditional and modified Cartesian views are not reflective 
of our beliefs about our survival. 
 
 Even though the Cartesian view of the self is not plausible, from an 
examination of the view, we learn that what we believe to be important for a 
person’s survival is the preservation of his or her mental capacities rather than 
the continuity of one’s mental activity. 
 
4.3  Dainton’s Theory 
 
 Our range of phenomenal experiences includes bodily experiences, 
mental images, conscious thoughts, emotional feelings and fringe feelings 
such as intuition and gut feelings. A temporal slice of typical phenomenal 
experiences will contain some or all of such experiences, and each and every 
experience in such a temporal slice is experienced together, and phenomenally 
unified. Dainton calls this experienced-togetherness, co-consciousness. When 
two experiences are experienced together, they are co-conscious, which is not 
                                                
18 Unger, Peter. Identity, Consciousness, and Value. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990.), 3–5.  
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to say that there is a third experience that unites the two. Co-consciousness is 
not an independent experiential element, and it does not possess its own 
phenomenal features; it is only the way in which experiences are related when 
they are experienced together.19  
 
Co-consciousness can be synchronic or diachronic. Synchronic 
phenomenal co-consciousness presents itself as experiences that occur at the 
same time. Experiences A and B are synchronically co-conscious if and only if 
they occur simultaneously as parts of the same experience. When I am seated 
on a cold park bench on a cold windy morning, I experience the coolness of 
the bench against my skin if I place my hands on it, and in that same moment, 
I also feel the cool breeze of the wind brush across my skin. The coolness of 
the bench and the cool breeze of the wind are synchronically co-conscious if 






Figure 1 Overlap model of phenomenal continuity20  
 
 
                                                
19 Dainton, Barry. The Phenomenal Self. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.), 34, 48. 
20 Ibid., 65. 
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Diachronic phenomenal co-consciousness manifests as each individual 
experience flowing seamlessly into the next experience, which is why our 
typical streams of consciousness “feel” continuous. A person’s experience of 
C-D is diachronically co-conscious with experience E-F if experiences C-D 
and E-F are experienced together in succession. (Figure. 1) We also 
experience D-E, but D-E is not a numerically distinct experience that holds in 
addition to C-D and E-F. The D in experience D-E is the same token 
experience as the D that occurs in experience C-D. Similarly, the E in 
experience D-E is the same token experience of E in E-F. Dainton calls this 
the overlap model of phenomenal continuity.21  
  
To apply the overlap model to our everyday experience, imagine 
listening to a symphony. Rather than having the experience of one note, and a 
separate experience of the next note, followed by another separate experience 
of the following note, I am inclined to think that I am experiencing an earlier 
note flowing into a later note, and I think of it as a complete experience of 
multiple notes. 
 
Dainton’s phenomenal continuity theory defines personal persistence 
solely in terms of a subject’s capacity for experience. He attempts to provide 
an account of the conditions under which both the capacity for experience and 
experiences belong to the same self, both at a time and over time. For his 
phenomenal continuity theory to be plausible, Dainton suggests that instead of 
regarding selves as essentially conscious, we should regard selves as 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
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potentially conscious, where a potentially conscious self (PCS) “is a thing that 
is capable of being conscious; a self has the capacity for consciousness at 
every moment at which it exists, and it possesses this capacity essentially. A 
self can lose consciousness temporarily, provided it retains the potential to be 
conscious.”22 
  
Since we do not consider losing consciousness temporarily, such as 
having a night of deep dreamless sleep or going under anesthesia to mean that 
we no longer exist, it seems reasonable to think that selves can exist through 
temporary periods of unconsciousness. When none of a subject’s experiential 
capacities are active, such as during temporary periods of unconsciousness, it 
does not mean that these capacities have been lost. These capacities still exist, 
and are simply dormant. It is only when the capacity for experience is 
irretrievably lost, such as when a person meets the criteria for information-
theoretic death that a self ceases to exist. We can define the identity of a 
person over time in terms of the existence and persistence of the capacity for 
consciousness, where these capacities are exercised at some times, but not at 
others. In this way, we can consider persons to be potentially conscious 
selves.23 
 
A subject that has the capacity to generate unified states of 
consciousness is called an experience producer. At any time, phenomenally 
unified experiences produced by an active experience producer belong to the 
                                                
22 Ibid., 79. 
23 Information theoretic death results when a human brain has degraded physically to an extent 
that recovery of the original person is theoretically impossible by current medical standards. 
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same subject, and phenomenally unified experiences that dormant experience 
producers such as those of a sleeping person would have produced had they 
been active, also belong to the same subject.24 
 
Two experience producers are phenomenally connected if and only if 
the experiences that they produce are directly connected (such as experiences 
e1 and e2 in figure 1), and phenomenally continuous if and only if they are 
related to one another by overlapping chains of phenomenal connectedness 
(experiences e1 and e3 in figure 1). 
 
If Dainton’s theory is not read and understood in its totality, one might 
think that Dainton is formulating a dispositional theory of the self, because he 
writes of experience producers that have the capacity to produce experiences, 
when in fact, he is offering an alternative to dispositional theories. Dainton’s 
phenomenal theory of the self cannot be grounded in physical objects that 
possess certain dispositions, because he states right from the start that his goal 
is to provide a “pure” phenomenal theory of the self. This goal to keep the 
theory purely phenomenal is what causes the bridge problem, and the 
objections that follow. 
 
4.4  The Bridge Problem 
 
A problem that arises for the phenomenal account is the issue of 
dealing with interruptions in phenomenal continuity, such as the break in my 
                                                
24 Dainton, Barry. The Phenomenal Self. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.), 77. 
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stream of consciousness that started last night after I went to bed, and ended 
today when I woke up and started the day with a new stream of consciousness. 
Dainton calls this the bridge problem – How can streams separated by a 
temporal interval but not linked by phenomenal continuity be related and said 
to belong to the same person? It is when the bridge problem is presented that it 
becomes clear that while Dainton’s phenomenal account provides an adequate 
explanation of intra-streamal unity, it is not able to do the same for inter-
streamal unity. The phenomenal continuity theory relies on counterfactuals to 
explain how two separate streams of consciousness belong to the same self, 
and while this reliance on counterfactuals is in itself not a problem for the 
theory, some counterexamples arise as a result of how the theory is framed in 
terms of counterfactuals. 
 
Other philosophers such as Johan Gustafsson and Galen Strawson 
accept different phenomenal approaches to personal identity that avoid the 
bridge problem, but their theories are not plausible.  
 
Gustafsson deals with the bridge problem by taking the position that 
we never have a break in our stream of consciousness. He argues that two 
experiences separated by deep dreamless sleep can be phenomenally 
connected or continuous and therefore be part of the same stream of 
consciousness. He thinks that there is nothing in the relation of phenomenal 
connectedness that rules out that the relation can hold between conscious 
states that are separated by a time gap. It has simply been taken for granted 
that when we fall into deep dreamless sleep, a break in a stream of 
 19 
consciousness exists between our falling asleep and waking up. According to 
his account, our lives are composed of only one single unified stream of 
consciousness, and we never really lose consciousness, even when we are in 
deep sleep or under anesthesia. We are still conscious, but at a very low level, 
and we simply have no recollection of it later. If we do not remember our 
experiences, it does not follow that we did not have experiences when we 
were not conscious.25 
 
He provides positive evidence for phenomenal continuity having 
bridged temporal gaps with anecdotes from patients who have been 
anaesthetized for an extended duration. They report that upon waking up, they 
felt as if no time had elapsed at all, and that their experience on waking up 
seemed to flow naturally from their last experience prior to being put under 
anesthesia. These examples that he provides, he takes as indicative of patients 
having experienced a single continuous stream of consciousness.26 
 
While initially attractive because it seems to avoid the bridge problem 
and it is not impossible that our lives are the length of a single stream of 
consciousness, it still is an implausible view, because while not impossible, 
we cannot rule out the possibility of a break in a stream of consciousness, so 
we cannot simply avoid the bridge problem by claiming that we never have a 
break in our stream of consciousness. 
 
                                                
25 Gustafsson, Johan E. "Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem."Philosophia 39 
(2011), 294. 
26 Ibid., 292–293. 
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A more radical solution to the bridge problem is to adopt a view 
similar to Strawson’s. He accepts that breaks in our stream of consciousness 
exist, but that we do not survive breaks in our stream of consciousness. Such a 
view implies that we do not survive a night of deep dreamless sleep or being 
put under anesthesia, and the result is that the life span of our selves is much 
shorter than most of us believe. According to Strawson, the belief we have in 
the persistence of our selves is an illusion. He holds a radical view of the ECS-
variety that is similar to the Traditional Cartesian View, in that the self cannot 
persist across a break in a stream of consciousness. We do not survive a break 
in our stream of consciousness, and we “start” each new stream as a new 
self.27 
 
Strawson’s position avoids the bridge problem completely, as well as 
the counterexamples I bring up next, since we start each new stream as a new 
self, but the consequences of holding such a view are that our selves do not 
persist through periods of unconsciousness, and we have much shorter life-
spans than we are used to taking them to be. This view is counterintuitive, 
because we tend to believe that we at least survive a night of deep dreamless 
sleep.  
 
Unlike Gustafsson and Strawson, Dainton does not try to avoid the 
bridge problem. He attempts to resolve it. His attempt requires us to consider 
selves as potentially conscious instead of essentially conscious. If a self is 
potentially conscious, it still exists as long as it continues to possess the 
                                                
27 Strawson, Galen. Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2009.), 217–231. 
 21 
potential for consciousness. This means that if I have lost consciousness 
because I am in a state of deep dreamless sleep or have been placed under 
anesthesia, I continue to exist, because I continue to possess the potential for 
consciousness since I can be woken up from my slumber, and anesthesia can 
wear off. If I no longer possess the potential for consciousness, I do not exist – 
for example, if I have died, been cremated and had my ashes sprinkled into the 
ocean, I will have lost the potential for consciousness permanently, because 
there is currently no way to bring me back from the ashes, so I will have 
ceased to exist. 
 
As potentially conscious selves, when we are awake, we are active 
experience producers, and our stream of consciousness flows on uninterrupted. 
When we are in deep sleep, under anesthesia or under conditions that render 
us temporarily unconscious, we are dormant experience producers. During 
such periods of dormancy, had we been awake and actively producing 
experiences, the resulting experiences would have belonged to a unified 
stream, joining the earlier and later actively produced experiences, making 
them co-streamal and co-subjective. 
 
Next I discuss two counterexamples to Dainton’s solution to the bridge 
problem, and I am not sure that Dainton will be able to respond to them by 





5  Objections to Dainton’s Theory 
5.1 Sleep or be Shot 
 
According to the phenomenal continuity theory, when we are asleep, 
our experience producing capacities are dormant, but had we been awake 
during that period of dormancy, we would have continued to produce 
experiences that would render the earlier and later streams a single stream. Put 
another way, the producer of my Monday night falling asleep experiences and 
the producer of my Tuesday morning waking up experiences would cause 
experiences that belong to the same stream, because if there had been no loss 
of consciousness, my experience producing capacities would have continued 
to produce experiences that would make my Monday night and Tuesday 
morning experiences belong to the same stream of consciousness.  
 
This suggests that the experiences I have prior to falling asleep and the 
experiences I have on waking belong to the same hypothetical stream, but this 
is not necessarily the case. Imagine a scenario in which a gun is held to my 
head, and I am told that I must make myself go to sleep immediately, or I will 
be shot in the head. Suppose that I do manage to fall asleep at gunpoint. The 
stream of consciousness that begins when I wake up cannot be said by Dainton 
to belong to the same self as the stream of consciousness before I fell asleep, 
because had I not fallen asleep, I would be dead since I would have been shot 
in the head. 
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This scenario illustrates a problem that results from the phenomenal 
continuity theory’s reliance on counterfactuals. According to Dainton, our 
experiences do not actually have to be phenomenally continuous in order to 
belong to the same conscious self; all that is required is a certain kind of 
hypothetical phenomenal continuity spelled out in counterfactual terms. 
 
5.2 No Time-Gap 
 
Breaks in a stream of consciousness need not come in the form of a 
temporal gap. An abrupt change in one’s mental state can also cause a break in 
a stream. It can happen that you fall asleep and wake up immediately without 
any moment in between that you are unconscious. Imagine yourself nodding 
off in class, only to be jolted awake immediately by the sudden movement of 
your head jerking forward. This is a case of a break in a stream of 
consciousness where falling-asleep phenomenology is followed immediately 
by waking-up phenomenology, with no time gap between falling asleep and 
waking up. Dainton’s theory cannot account for a break between streams with 
no time-gap. 
 
In the case of a break between streams with a time-gap, dormant 
experience producers fill the gap between streams with the experiences that 
they would have produced had they been active, but without a time-gap 
between earlier and later streams, experience producers are active throughout, 
yet earlier and later streams are not co-streamal, and the phenomenal 
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continuity theory wrongly implies that the earlier and later experiences are not 
co-streamal and co-subjective.  
 
When the phenomenal continuity theory is applied to a scenario with 
no time gap, it produces the wrong result. Returning to the scenario of nodding 
off in class, your nodding-off experience ea at ta and post-nodding-off 
experience eb at tb belong to the same self, only if the experience producers of 
ea and eb had produced co-streamal experiences between ta and tb. Every 
relevant experience producer existing from ta to tb did actually produce 
experiences, since the only relevant experience producers existing from ta and 
tb were the experience producers that produced ea and eb, except that the 
resulting experiences ea and eb are not co-streamal and co-subjective. 
 
Other possible ways to account for such a break in a stream of 
consciousness include appealing to sameness of body, or psychological 
continuity. Neither appeals to Dainton, since his theory is a formulation to 
escape bodily and psychological continuity theories, and he prefers a “pure” 
theory that appeals only to experience. I imagine that the only way Dainton 
might account for a break between two streams without a time-gap is to take 
counterfactual dependency a step further, and hypothesize that if there had 
been a time gap between my nodding off and waking up, they would be 
related in the way described by the phenomenal continuity theory.  
 
To do this, Dainton only needs to modify my counterexample slightly 
to apply the phenomenal continuity theory in its original form. In the modified 
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version, I fall asleep in class, but suppose that my head does not jerk forward 
immediately. Instead, my head only jerks forward after 5 seconds, and this 
delayed head-jerk wakes me up. Dainton can then proceed to apply the 
phenomenal continuity theory’s counterfactual scenario. During the 5 seconds 
that I was asleep, had my experience producing capacities produced 
experiences, these experiences would have been co-streamal with both my 
earlier and later streams. 
 
This is not a satisfactory resolution to the bridge problem because it 
still falls to the original counterfactual dependency problem raised in §5.1, and 
it adds an extra layer of counterfactual dependency with the addition of a 
hypothetical time gap. It is not difficult to think of an example where the 
addition of a hypothetical time gap does not solve the problem and instead 
causes the second experience not to occur at all. Take for example the 
following scenario where there is no time-gap between e1 and e2, 
 
e1: I turn to look towards my right, and I see a machete being 
swung at my head. 
e2: I jump out of the way. 
 
 
In the normal no time-gap scenario, I look to my right, and see a 
machete being swung at my head and instantly jump out of the way, and so, 
manage to stay alive. Suppose instead that when I turn to look towards my 
right, and I see a machete being swung at my head, I do not jump out of the 
way, but I lose consciousness for a few seconds. In this case, the experience 
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producer responsible for e2 would not have produced e2, or any other 
experience because in the seconds that I lost consciousness, my head would 
have been chopped off, and I would have died. 
 
Unlike the first straightforward scenario of falling asleep in class and 
waking up instantly by the jerking of one’s head when a hypothetical time gap 
is applied, e2 does not happen, because my loss of consciousness would have 
occurred during the time gap to prevent the occurrence of e2. Dainton is not 
able to add a hypothetical time gap to “rescue” all scenarios, as the second 
example demonstrates, in which case he will have to say that e1 and e2 do not 
belong to the same self in the actual case in which I escape decapitation. 
 
6 Potentially Conscious Selves 
 
As part of his solution to the bridge problem, Dainton asks that we 
think of selves as potentially conscious rather than essentially conscious. Such 
a conception allows selves to exist in both conscious and unconscious modes. 
He is correct when he says that we tend to regard ourselves as potentially 
conscious because we do not think that we go out of existence when we are 
temporarily unconscious such as during a night of deep dreamless sleep. 
 
To Dainton, it does not matter if a potentially conscious self can ever 
exercise its potential for consciousness. All that matters is that it has that 
potential. Such a conception allows subjects such as a permanently 
anesthetized foetus to be considered a potentially conscious self. Dainton also 
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does not rule out that non-physical substances might possess the capacity to 
produce experiences. This allows us to consider the possibility of our survival 
as a non-human entity, and this is relevant, given the progress made in 
artificial intelligence. This way, there is less restriction on what might be in 
possession of the potential for consciousness, and it does not necessarily have 
to be a human-like subject that possesses the potential for consciousness. I 
think that Dainton’s concept of potential for consciousness can be developed 
further, and I attempt to do so in the rest of this section.28 
 
A subject’s potential for consciousness may be affected by intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors. Intrinsic factors are part of the essential nature of the 
subject. Extrinsic factors are not part of a subject’s essential nature, and they 
are a result of external features. Both intrinsic and extrinsic factors can come 
in degrees, but it is the intrinsic factors that are more relevant to our 
discussion. The introduction of extrinsic factors can and sometimes affect the 
total (intrinsic + extrinsic) potential for consciousness. Extrinsic factors can 
make a difference to total potential for consciousness in two ways. Extrinsic 
factors can either affect intrinsic factors directly (the application of general 
anethesia on a person alters the person’s state of consciousness, making his 
intrinsic, and hence total potential for consciousness lower than it would be if 
he were fully awake and conscious), or by changing the external environment 
of the subject (the presence of a poisonous snake in an otherwise safe room 
lowers the total potential for consciousness of the subject). When external 
                                                
28 Dainton, Barry. "Selfhood And The Flow Of Experience." Grazer Philosophische 
Studien 84, no. 1 (2012), 193. 
 28 
factors are held constant, it is only differences in intrinsic factors that 
determine the potential for consciousness.  
 
Consider our current situation with medical technology; it restricts the 
extent to which we are able to resuscitate an unconscious person. In this way, 
we might consider current medical technology as an extrinsic factor that is 
fixed and acting as a limiting factor. Suppose the degree of potential for 
consciousness of human subjects lies along a spectrum with zero potential for 
consciousness on one end of the spectrum and full potential for consciousness 
on the other end. A case of a subject with zero potential for consciousness 
might be one of any cases that involve irreversible damage to the person such 
that, short of a miracle, consciousness cannot be restored to that entity. 
Cremation ashes are a case of 0% potential for consciousness, since we 
currently have no way of reversing the process of cremation to bring a person 
back to life from such a physical state. An example of a subject with 100% 
potential for consciousness is a fully awake and functional human being. 
Between these two extremes, other cases such as biological death, 
cryogenically preserved bodies, deep dreamless sleep, minimally conscious 
states, persistent vegetative states, and comatose patients lie along the 
spectrum. Consider the following cases. 29 
 
 
                                                
29 A minimally conscious state is characterized by some evidence of awareness of self and/or 
the environment, and patients tend to improve.  
A persistent vegetative state presents with the absence of responsiveness and awareness due to 
overwhelming dysfunction of the cerebral hemispheres. Patients may have complex reflexes, 
including eye movements, yawning, and involuntary movements, but show no awareness of 
self or environment.  
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(1) A fully awake and conscious person 
 
(2) A person in deep dreamless sleep 
 
(3) A person under general anethesia 
 
(4) A person in a minimally conscious state 
 
(5) A person in a persistent vegetative state 
(6) A person who meets the criteria for information-theoretic 
death. 
(7) A cryopreserved body 
(8) A dead person who has been cremated and is now a pile of 
ashes. 
 
The differences in total potential for consciousness in cases (1) to (8) 
can be attributed to intrinsic factors, because the extrinsic factor, currently 
available medical technology is fixed. Example (1) is a case of full potential 
for consciousness, and (8) is a case of zero potential for consciousness. A 
person in deep dreamless sleep and a fully awake and functioning person are 
not intrinsically identical, but they are intrinsically similar. A dreamlessly 
sleeping person is intrinsically more similar than a person under general 
anesthesia to a fully awake and functioning human. The closer the intrinsic 
similarity of a subject is to a fully awake and functioning human, the higher its 
intrinsic potential for consciousness. 
 
The potential for consciousness in cases (2) to (7) vary depending on 
how dissimilar they are from a case possessing full potential for 
consciousness, such as (1). It usually takes no medical assistance to wake a 
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person in deep dreamless sleep. A person under general anesthesia requires the 
removal of anesthesia before he can be conscious, but barring any medical 
complications, it is usually a routine post-surgical procedure. As we move 
further down the list, more advanced technology is needed to resuscitate a 
person, and at some point, we are no longer able to resuscitate a person 
because we are limited by current medical technology. 
 
A question that arises is if there is a definite cut off along the spectrum 
that dictates where some person or thing begins to possess the potential for 
experience. I think that any such cut off will be arbitrary, and impossible to 
define. There may be no fact of the matter as to where exactly a subject lies on 
the spectrum, but we can still judge roughly where it lies, though it is likely 
that there will be disagreement about it. When considering the cases that fall 
in between, and it is not clear where a subject might fall on the spectrum, 
instead of attempting to define how such a cut off may be determined, we 
should consider each case individually in the context of the relevant extrinsic 
factors to determine if there is potential for consciousness, and while it might 
not be possible to quantify this potential precisely, we can at least make an 
informed decision as to where it might lie on the spectrum relative to other 
subjects. 
 
 In some cases there may be disagreement about whether some cases 
belong on the spectrum of potentially conscious selves at all, because different 
interpretations of the relevant extrinsic and intrinsic factors are possible. 
While medical technology may be fixed, some might argue that even when 
 31 
fixed, the extent to which we are able to manipulate that technology is 
dependent on the skills of the doctor. Or there may be disagreement on the 
aspect of intrinsic factors. It might not always be clear where the line is drawn 
between a patient in a minimally conscious state and a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state. Some might argue that cases (6) to (8) do not possess the 
potential for consciousness, while others might argue that cases (5) to (8) do 
not possess the potential for consciousness. 
 
While I have applied such a framework to cases involving human 
subjects, variations on such a framework can be applied to most other cases, 
including those involving non-human subjects. As my example of cases (1) to 
(8) illustrates, the potential for consciousness is a function of both intrinsic 
and external factors, and it follows that the potential for consciousness might 
not be absolute, but instead be a matter of degree. If the potential for 
consciousness is matter of degree, then the phenomenal continuity theory 
implies that survival is a matter of degree, and if this is the case, we have no 
reason to reject the hybrid theory that I will propose in favour of the “pure” 
phenomenal continuity theory on the basis that the hybrid theory inherits from 
the psychological continuity theory that survival is a matter of degree. 
 
7. A Psycho-Phenomenal Theory of the Self 
7.1  Introduction 
 
I propose a hybrid-theory that appeals to both phenomenal and 
psychological continuity. The phenomenal continuity theory is not a complete 
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description of our personal identity over time, because it cannot provide a 
satisfactory account of inter-streamal unity. Memory along with other 
psychological states such as beliefs, desires and intentions can fill the gaps 
that arise as a result of taking Dainton’s phenomenal approach, and 
psychological states play such a role in my proposed hybrid theory. 
 
Such a hybrid theory does more than simply combine Dainton’s 
phenomenal continuity theory and Parfit’s psychological continuity theory. It 
retains the benefits of Dainton’s account of intra-streamal unity, while 
providing a better account of inter-streamal unity with the use of Parfit’s 
psychological continuity theory. It allows for survival when there is a break in 
either phenomenal or psychological continuity, as long as either phenomenal 
or psychological continuity persists when there is a break in the other. In cases 
where there is a concurrent break in both phenomenal continuity and 
psychological continuity, there is no survival. 
 
In the hybrid theory, Parfit’s psychological-continuity and Dainton’s 
stream of consciousness run concurrently. Dainton’s phenomenal continuity 
theory is the dominant theory that we use as an account of personal identity 
during intra-streamal periods. Parfit’s psychological continuity theory runs 
“silently” in the background during intra-streamal periods, but becomes the 
dominant theory that accounts for the continuity of the self if a break occurs 
between streams. To better illustrate how such a hybrid theory works; I 
describe how it accounts for breaks in either phenomenal or psychological 
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continuity, and a concurrent break in both phenomenal and psychological 
continuity. 
 






Figure 2. Break between streams with time gap, but no break in psychological 
continuity – self is preserved by direct psycho-phenomenal relation. 
 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the first of two ways in which a hybrid theory 
can account for the bridge problem. There is a break with a time gap between 
streams S1 and S2, and had we adhered to a “pure” phenomenal continuity 
theory, we would have had to appeal to dormant experience producers to unify 
streams S1 and S2. With a hybrid theory, and assuming that there is no 
concurrent break in psychological continuity between t2 and t3, psychological 
states p2 and p3 are psychologically continuous, and belong to the same self. 
To unify streams S1 and S2, without appealing to dormant experience 
producers, we need a direct or indirect psycho-phenomenal relation between 
any psychological state that occurs during the duration of the later stream S2 to 
any experience that occurs during the earlier stream S1.   
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It can be said that e1 belongs to the same self as e4 iff, 
 
1. e1 and e4 belong to the same stream of consciousness, or, 
 
2. e1 and e4 belong to different streams of consciousness, but there 
is no break in psychological continuity, and p4, a psychological 
state that corresponds to e4 is psycho-phenomenally continuous 
with e1 from an earlier stream. 
 
 
Let us consider the following scenario, 
S1: yesterday’s stream of consciousness 
t1: yesterday at three o’clock in the afternoon 
e1: my experience of eating an ice cream 
p1: my desire to finish eating the ice cream 
 
S2: today’s stream of consciousness 
t4: today at ten o’clock in the morning 
e4: my experience of reading the morning papers and seeing an 
advertorial for a new brand of ice cream. 
p4: my memory of eating the ice cream (e1) yesterday at three 
o’clock in the afternoon (t1) 
 
States p1 and p4 are psychologically continuous because there is no 
break in my psychology despite a night of dreamless sleep (I was not hit on 
the head while asleep causing permanent head damage and a change in my 
psychology), so I can appeal to psychological continuity to bridge the gap 
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between streams S1 and S2 that occurred because I fell into a deep dreamless 
sleep. Now at ten o’clock in the morning today (t4), I have an experience of 
reading the morning papers and seeing an advertorial for a new brand of ice 
cream (e4), and this prompts a memory (p4) of eating ice cream (p1) yesterday 
at 3p.m. (t1). Here, e1 and e4 belong to different streams, but they belong to the 
same self because a direct psycho-phenomenal relation exists between e1 and 
p4. 
 
As psycho-phenomenal continuity need not be direct, the self can also 
be preserved by indirect psycho-phenomenal connections. Figure 3 provides 




Figure 3. Break between streams with time gap, but no break in psychological 
continuity – self is preserved by indirect psycho-phenomenal relations. 
 
 
 There are multiple ways to preserve the self, using indirect psycho-
phenomenal connections. I present just one example, using a scenario similar 
to the direct psycho-phenomenal relation case,  
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S1: yesterday’s stream of consciousness 
t1: yesterday at three o’clock in the afternoon 
e1: my experience of eating an ice cream 
p1: my desire to finish eating the ice cream 
 
S2: today’s stream of consciousness 
t3: today at seven o’clock in the morning 
t4: today at ten o’clock in the morning 
e3: my experience of waking up. 
p3: my first thought when I wake up – the memory that I had ice 
cream yesterday, and must have it again today. 
e4: my experience of reading the morning papers and seeing an 
advertorial for a new brand of ice cream. 
p4*: my recollection of e3 – to have ice cream again today. 
 
 At 10 o’clock in the morning when I read the morning papers and see 
an ice cream advertorial (e4), it reminds me of my desire upon waking up, to 
have ice cream again today (p3) because I remembered my previous day’s 
experience of eating ice cream (e1). In this scenario, it is through indirect 
psycho-phenomenal connections that the self is preserved. 
 
7.3  Break in Psychological Continuity, With No Concurrent Break in 
Stream of Consciousness. 
 
In Figure 4, we have a case of a break in psychological continuity, but 
the stream of consciousness carries on with no concurrent break. In such a 
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scenario, the self is preserved, because intra-streamal unity of the stream of 
consciousness is not broken during the break in psychological continuity 












An example of such a situation is the case of a person who has hit his 
head at t1 and is suffering from temporary retrograde amnesia between t1 and 
t2. Between t1 and t2, his stream of consciousness is not broken because he is 
awake throughout, and he retains his experiential capacities, but has no 
memory of who he is, or any of his past desires and intentions, etc. At t2, he 
hits his head again, and this causes him to recall hitting his head at t1 and 
everything prior to t1, but not any experiences that occurred between t1 and t2. 
He does not lose any of his psychological traits that he possessed prior to t1, 




7.4   Concurrent Breaks in Stream of Consciousness and Psychological 
Continuity 
  
 In cases where there is a concurrent break in both a person’s stream of 
consciousness and psychological continuity, there is a loss of self, according 








In figure 5, streams S1 and S2 cannot be joined by either phenomenal or 
psychological continuity. There is no way to link phenomenal states in S2 to 
S1, or psychological states before and at t2 to t3 and after. Such a scenario is 
easily imaginable and unfortunately happens occasionally. 
 
Suppose that e1 is a person’s experience of starting his car engine, and 
between t1 and up till just before t2, he is driving. At t2, he has the unfortunate 
experience e2 of being hit by a trailer truck, and loses consciousness for the 
period between t2 and t3. At t3, he wakes up in the hospital with no recollection 
at all of what has happened prior to the accident, and he remembers nothing of 
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his past. At t4, he is still in hospital, and remembers what has occurred since 
waking up at t3, but absolutely nothing of what happened at t2 or before that. 
He does not recall who he is, and cannot answer questions about his family, 
favourite food or music prior to the accident. In such a case, most of us who 
subscribe to a mentalistic account of the self will agree that he is no longer the 
same self that he used to be prior to the accident at t2. 
 
The hybrid account is able to deal with the “sleep or be shot” and 
break between streams with “no time-gap” counterexamples, as well as the 
possible breaks in the examples above as long as there is no concurrent break 
in one’s stream of consciousness psychological continuity. I take this inability 
to deal with a concurrent break in streams of consciousness and psychological 
continuity as support for the hybrid theory, because if there is a concurrent 
break in one’s stream of consciousness and psychological continuity, we will 
be hard pressed to say that the person after the break is the same person before 
the break. 
 
8. Objections to the Hybrid Theory 
 
Dainton’s first objection to such a theory is most likely to be that such 
a hybrid theory is impure. He provides two reasons in support of a pure 
theory. The first is that in the case of an impure account, the co-subjectivity of 
experiences within streams is determined by a different factor from co-
subjectivity of experiences between separated streams. This results in different 
persistence conditions for the same subject during inter-streamal and intra-
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streamal periods, and this makes them different entities during inter-streamal 
and intra-streamal periods. My proposed hybrid theory does not provide 
different persistence conditions for inter-streamal and intra-streamal periods. 
Both psychological continuity and the stream of consciousness of a subject run 
concurrently, and provide persistence conditions concurrently, and not 
disjunctively.30 
 
Second, Dainton claims that thought experiments suggest that an 
experience-based account of survival is the most compelling account 
available. He does not provide further support for this claim. As far as there 
are thought experiments that support his theory, equally there are thought 
experiments that support both the pure psychological continuity theory and my 
hybrid theory. One’s conviction that their thought experiments are compelling 
is not support for a theory. Further, I have also provided equally compelling 
thought experiments (“sleep or be shot” and “no time gap” in §5.1 and §5.2) 
that are counterexamples to Dainton’s theory.31 
 
A third objection that might be raised is that according to the hybrid 
theory, survival is a matter of degree. In §6, I discussed Dainton’s reliance on 
the concept of potentially conscious selves, and how Dainton’s definition of 
potential for consciousness allows for survival to be a matter of degree, rather 
than determinate, in which case, survival according to the phenomenal 
continuity theory is also a matter of degree, making both theories no different 
in this aspect. 
                                                
30 Dainton, Barry. The Phenomenal Self. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.), 76–77. 
31 Ibid. 
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 Lastly, it might be brought up that according to the hybrid theory, there 
is no survival of the self when there is a concurrent break in one’s stream of 
consciousness and psychological continuity (figure 5), but the original 
phenomenal continuity theory allows for survival of the self because it is able 
to draw on the concept of dormant experience producers. While it may be 
raised as a point in favour of a purely phenomenal continuity theory, I do not 
consider this a problem for the hybrid theory, because I consider the loss of 
self in such a case support for the hybrid theory, rather than a case against it. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of this paper, I made it my aim to answer one 
question about personal identity – what does it take for a conscious self to 
survive from an earlier to a later time? I examined Parfit’s psychological 
account and Dainton’s phenomenal account, and found them both to be 
insufficient accounts of personal identity over time. Dainton’s phenomenal 
account provides a good account of intra-streamal unity, but it is unable to 
provide a satisfactory account of inter-streamal unity, and falls to the 
counterexamples that I have raised. 
 
The answer to the question raised can be supplied by the hybrid theory 
that I have proposed. Such a theory does not fall to the bridge problem or the 
counterexamples that the phenomenal account is susceptible to, and it is also 
in line with our commonsense intuitions about our selves – that we are persons 
who are capable of experience and also in possession of psychological states 
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such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and memories that persist over time even 
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